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Abstract—Millimeter wave (mmWave) communications have
been considered as a key technology for future 5G wireless
networks. In order to overcome the severe propagation loss
of mmWave channel, mmWave multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) systems with analog/digital hybrid precoding and com-
bining transceiver architecture have been widely considered.
However, physical layer security (PLS) in mmWave MIMO
systems and the secure hybrid beamformer design have not been
well investigated. In this paper, we consider the problem of
hybrid precoder and combiner design for secure transmission
in mmWave MIMO systems in order to protect the legitimate
transmission from eavesdropping. When eavesdropper’s channel
state information (CSI) is known, we first propose a joint analog
precoder and combiner design algorithm which can prevent
the information leakage to the eavesdropper. Then, the digital
precoder and combiner are computed based on the obtained
effective baseband channel to further maximize the secrecy rate.
Next, if prior knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable,
we develop an artificial noise (AN)-based hybrid beamforming ap-
proach, which can jam eavesdropper’s reception while maintain-
ing the quality-of-service (QoS) of intended receiver at the pre-
specified level. Simulation results demonstrate that our proposed
algorithms offer significant secrecy performance improvement
compared with other hybrid beamforming algorithms.
Index Terms—Millimeter wave (mmWave) communications,
multi-input multi-output (MIMO), physical layer security (PLS),
hybrid precoding, artificial noise (AN).
I. INTRODUCTION
Millimeter wave (mmWave) communications, which can
provide orders-of-magnitudewider bandwidth than current cel-
lular bands, has been considered as a key technology for future
5G wireless networks [1]. The smaller wavelength of mmWave
signals enables a large antenna array to be packed in a small
physical dimension at the transceiver ends. However, conven-
tional full-digital precoder and combiner are realized using a
large number of expensive radio frequency (RF) chains and
energy-intensive analog-to-digital converters (ADCs), which
are impractical in the mmWave communication systems. Re-
cently, economic and energy-efficient analog/digital hybrid
precoding and combining transceiver architecture has emerged
as a promising solution in mmWave multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) systems.
The hybrid beamforming structure applies a large number
of analog phase shifters (PSs) to implement high-dimensional
analog beamformer and a small number of RF chains for low-
dimensional digital beamformer to provide the necessary flex-
ibility to perform multiplexing/multiuser transmission [2]. The
existing hybrid beamforming designs can be categorized into
i) codebook-based scheme in which the analog beamformer is
selected from certain candidate vectors, such as array response
vectors of the channel and discrete fourier transform (DFT)
beamformers [3]-[5]; ii) codebook-free scheme in which the
infinite resolution of PSs is assumed [6], [7]. Currently,
the codebook-based beamforming designs are more popular
because of the less complexity and satisfactory performance
due to the special structure of hybrid beamformer and the
characteristic of mmWave MIMO channels.
While existing hybrid beamforming designs focus on im-
proving spectral efficiency of a point-to-point mmWave MIMO
channel, however, the secrecy in a mmWave MIMO wiretap
channel and the beamforming design for the secure transmis-
sion have not been well investigated. In recent years, physical
layer security (PLS) has been identified as a promising strategy
for secure wireless communications. Especially, beamforming
technology becomes a powerful tool for enhancing the physical
layer security in conventional MIMO systems [8], [9]. With
the spatial degrees of freedom (DoF) provided by multiple an-
tennas, the transmitter can adjust its beamforming orientation
to reduce/prevent the information leakage to eavesdroppers or
generate artificial noise (AN) to jam potential eavesdroppers.
However, the obtained results cannot be directly applied to
mmWave MIMO systems due to the different propagation
characteristics and the special hybrid beamforming archi-
tecture. Therefore, secure transmission in mmWave MIMO
systems attracts new research interests [10]-[12].
In [10], the network-wide PLS performance of a mmWave
cellular network was investigated under a stochastic geom-
etry framework. In [11], the authors considered a mmWave
system with the multi-input single-output (MISO) channel
and presented two simple beamformer designs for the secure
transmission. Based on this system model, in [12] the authors
further introduced a new form of AN generation method
Fig. 1. The mmWave MIMO wiretap system with hybrid precoder and
combiners. The channel is modeled as scatterer-sharing model.
depending on the propagation characteristics of the mmWave
channel. Unfortunately, all those mentioned works focus on
the comprehensive secrecy performance analysis rather than
the beamformer design. More importantly, the presented sim-
ple beamformer designs are based on the conventional full-
digital beamforming architecture, which are not practical in
the mmWave MIMO systems comparing with the hybrid
beamforming structure. To the best of our knowledge, the
hybrid beamformer design for the secure transmission in the
mmWave MIMO systems has not been studied yet.
In this paper, we investigate hybrid beamformer design for
the secure transmission and propose a novel codebook-based
hybrid precoder and combiner design algorithm in order to
protect the legitimate transmission from eavesdropping. In
the case that eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI)
is available, we first develop a joint analog precoder and
combiner design algorithm which can prevent the informa-
tion leakage to the eavesdropper. Then, the digital precoder
and combiner are computed based on the obtained effec-
tive baseband channel to further maximize the secrecy rate.
Then, when prior knowledge of the eavesdropper’s CSI is
unavailable, we introduce an AN-based hybrid beamforming
approach, which can generate disturbance to the eavesdropper
while maintaining the quality-of-service (QoS) of the intended
receiver at the pre-specified level. Simulation results demon-
strate the significant secrecy performance improvement of our
proposed algorithms compared with other hybrid beamforming
algorithms.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider a mmWave MIMO wiretap system as illustrated
in Fig. 1, in which the legitimate transmitter Alice is equipped
with Na antennas and N
RF
a RF chains to simultaneously
transmitNs data streams to the legitimate receiver Bob, who is
equipped with Nb antennas and N
RF
b RF chains. To ensure the
efficiency of the communication with the limited number of
RF chains, we assume NRF = N
RF
a = N
RF
b and the number
of data streams is constrained as Ns ≤ NRF . There also exists
an eavesdropper Eve, who is equipped with Ne antennas and
NRFe RF chains, Ns ≤ NRFe , and attempt to overhear the data
transmission from Alice to Bob.
The transmitted symbols are firstly processed by an NRF ×
Ns baseband digital precoder FBB , then up-converted to the
RF domain via NRF RF chains before being precoded with
an Na × NRF analog precoder FRF . While the baseband
precoder FBB enables both amplitude and phase modifica-
tions, the analog precoder FRF is implemented by analog
components like phase shifters and its elements are constrained
to satisfy with constant magnitude. In the codebook-based
precoder scheme, the analog beamformer is selected from a
pre-specified codebook F , i.e. a set of Na × 1 vector with
constant-magnitude entries. The normalized power constraint
is given by ‖FRFFBB‖2F = Ns. Therefore, the transmit signal
has a form of
x =
√
PFRFFBBs (1)
where P is the transmitted power and s is the Ns× 1 symbol
vector such that E{ssH} = 1
Ns
INs .
Denote Hb ∈ CNb×Na as the channel matrix of Alice-to-
Bob channel. Let nb ∈ CNb×1 represent the noise vector
of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) CN (0, σ2b )
elements. At Bob, the received signal
rb = Hbx+ nb (2)
are first processed by the analog combiner of Bob WRF,b,
then the digital combiner WBB,b ∈ CNRF×Ns . Let Wb ,
WRF,bWBB,b and F , FRFFBB for simplicity. Thus, the
processed receive signal at Bob can be expressed as
sˆb =
√
PWHb HbFs +W
H
b nb, (3)
where the subscript “b” indicates Bob.
The signal processing at Eve have the same procedure.
Let He ∈ CNe×Na denote the Alice-to-Eve eavesdropping
channel and let ne ∈ CNe×1 represent the noise vectors of
i.i.d. CN (0, σ2e) elements. Then, we have the processed receive
signal at Eve
sˆe =
√
PWHe HeFs+W
H
e ne, (4)
where the subscript “e” indicates Eve.
B. MmWave MIMO Channel Model
The mmWave MIMO channel can be described with the
widely used limited scattering channel, in which the number of
scatters is L, and each scatter is further assumed to contribute
a single propagation path between the transmitter and the
receiver. Under this model, the Alice-to-Bob channel matrix
Hb can be expressed as
Hb =
√
NaNb
ρb
Lb∑
lb=1
αlbab(θlb)a
H
a (φlb), (5)
where ρb denotes the average path-loss between Alice and
Bob, and αlb is the complex gain of the lb-th path and
assumed to be Rayleigh distributed. The variables θlb ∈ [0, 2pi]
and φlb ∈ [0, 2pi] are the lb-th path’s azimuth angles of
departure or arrival (AoDs/AoAs) of the transmitter and the
receiver, respectively. aa(φlb) and ab(θlb) are the antenna
array response vectors at the transmitter and the receiver,
respectively. In this paper, we assume the transmitter and the
receivers adopt uniform linear arrays (ULA) for simplicity and
then aa(φlb) and ab(φlb) are given by
aa(φlb)=
1
Na
[1, ej(2π/λ)d sin(φlb ), ..., ej(Na−1)(2π/λ)d sin(φlb )]T ,(6)
ab(φlb)=
1
Nb
[1, ej(2π/λ)d sin(θlb ), ..., ej(Nb−1)(2π/λ)d sin(θlb )]T , (7)
where λ is the signal wavelength and d is the distance between
antenna elements. The Alice-to-Eve channel matrix can be
written in a similar fashion as
He =
√
NaNe
ρe
Le∑
le=1
αleae(θle)a
H
a (φle) (8)
with different AoAs θle and AoDs φle .
Due to the sparse property of mmWave MIMO channel,
mmWave communication is usually considered as more secure
than conventional MIMO systems since the generated beam-
former is too narrow to be eavesdropped if the Eve is not close
to Bob. However, it has been verified that rough surface and
tiny building cracks can cause diffuse scattering in mmWave
channel and the diffuse range increases as the wavelength
shrinks [13]. Therefore, it is highly possible that different
receivers share some common scatterers, as shown in Fig. 1.
In other words, when Bob and Eve have similar AoDs with
some common scatterers and Alice use those AoDs to transmit
the secret information to Bob, Eve will have chance to receive
very strong signal from Alice, resulting in severe information
leakage. Therefore, it is easier for Eve to eavesdrop secret
information in this scatterer-sharing model and we aim to
investigate the physical layer security for the mmWave MIMO
systems with the scatterer-sharing model.
C. Problem Formulation
In the context of physical layer security, the secrecy rate is
usually used as the performance metric:
Rs = [log2 det(INs + Sb)− log2 det(INs + Se)]+ (9)
where
Sb =
P
Ns
R−1n,b(WBB,b)
H(WRF,b)
HHbFRFFBB
×FHBBFHRFHHb WRF,bWBB,b, (10)
Se =
P
Ns
R−1n,e(WBB,e)
H(WRF,e)
HHeFRFFBB
×FHBBFHRFHHe WRF,eWBB,e, (11)
Rn,b = σ
2
b (WBB,b)
H(WRF,b)
HWRF,bWBB,b, (12)
Rn,e = σ
2
e(WBB,e)
H(WRF,e)
HWRF,eWBB,e. (13)
In the following, we carry out simulations to illustrate the
security threaten in the mmWave MIMO systems. We assume
both Hb and He are known to Alice and Bob and first
consider the full-digital precoder and combiner scheme. Fig.
2 shows the secrecy rate under beamforming designs with:
1) no PLS effort; 2) generalized singular value decomposition
(GSVD)-based PLS approach [9]; 3) generalized eigen decom-
position (GED)-based PLS approach [8]. It can be verified
that the mmWave MIMO systems with ordinary (no PLS
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Fig. 2. Secrecy rate versus SNR, full-digital precoder and combiner (Na =
Nb = Ne = 192, NRF = 4).
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Fig. 3. Secrecy rate versus SNR, hybrid precoder and combiner (Na =
Nb = Ne = 192, NRF = 4).
effort) beamforming design have notable information leakage
in the high SNR range. Therefore, the legitimate transceiver
needs to adopt beamforming with PLS efforts. In addition,
unlike the conventional MIMO system, the GSVD approach
is not as good as the GED approach under mmWave MIMO
systems, which is because of the sparsity of the mmWave
channel. Therefore, we will use GED effort with full-digital
beamforming as our secrecy performance benchmark in the
following simulation studies.
In order to spotlight the impact of hybrid precoding and
combining architecture considered in this paper, in Fig. 3
we conduct the simulation using two representative hybrid
beamforming algorithms: 1) codebook-based Spatially Sparse
Precoding (SSP) [3]; 2) codebook-free PE-AltMin (PE) [6].
For the PLS effort, we use these two approaches to find secure
hybrid beamformers by minimizing the Euclidean distance
between hybrid beamformers and the GED-based full-digital
secure beamformers. Fig. 3 illustrates that the secrecy rate
decreases dramatically when mmWave MIMO systems employ
hybrid precoder and combiner, resulting in severe information
leakage to the eavesdropper. Moreover, the gap between the
hybrid beamforming algorithms and the full-digital benchmark
is quite large, which awaits researchers’ investigation.
Inspired by the phenomenon illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3, in
this paper we aim to develop a PLS-based hybrid precoder and
combiner design for the secure transmission. Specifically, let
F and W denote the beamsteering codebooks for the analog
precoder and combiner, respectively. If BRFt (B
RF
r ) bits are
used to quantize the AoD (AoA), F andW will consist of all
possible analog precoding and combining vectors, which can
be presented as
F = {at(2pii/2BRFt ) : i = 1, . . . , 2BRFt }, (14)
W = {ar(2pii/2BRFr ) : i = 1, . . . , 2BRFr }. (15)
The PLS-based hybrid precoder and combiner design problem
can be formulated as follows:
{F∗RF ,F∗BB,W∗RF,b,W∗BB,b}=argmaxRs (16)
s.t. FRF (:, l) ∈F , ∀l = 1, . . . , NRF , (17)
WRF,b(:, l) ∈W , ∀l = 1, . . . , NRF , (18)
‖FRFFBB‖2F =Ns. (19)
In the next section, we divide the problem according to
the availability of the eavesdropper’s CSI. We first consider
the scenario under which Alice and Bob know eavesdropper’s
channel He and develop our codebook-based hybrid beam-
former design algorithm. Then, we study the case where the
eavesdropper’s CSI is not available and AN-aided methods are
adopted in the hybrid beamforming design problem.
III. SECURE JOINT HYBRID BEAMFORMER AND
COMBINER DESIGN
A. Known Eavesdropper’s Channel
Under this condition, our algorithm starts with performing
singular value decomposition (SVD) of He as
He = UeΣeV
H
e (20)
where Ue and Ve are unitary matrices, Σe is an Ne × Na
diagonal matrix of singular values arranged in a decreasing
order. Due to the sparsity of the mmWave MIMO channel,
He can be represented as
He = U˜eΣ˜eV˜
H
e (21)
where Σ˜e is a diagonal matrix whose elements are the first
Lb nonzero singular values, U˜e and V˜e contain the most Lb
left columns of Ue and Ve, respectively.
In an effort to prevent eavesdropping from Eve, Alice
should elaborately design her precoder to avoid the AoD
components ofHe in order to minimize Eve’s reception. Thus,
to implement the secure transmission, we propose to remove
the AoD components of He from Hb by
H1 , Hb(I− V˜eV˜He ). (22)
By this operation, H1 contains only the AoD components of
Hb but almost no AoD component of He. After this initial
processing, we successively select the i-th (i = 1, . . . , NRF )
analog precoder and combiner pair to maximize the cor-
responding channel gain while suppressing the co-channel
interference. The joint design problem can be successively
solved by the following optimization problem:
{w∗i , f∗i } = arg max
wi∈W
fi∈F
|wHi Hifi|, i = 1, . . . , NRF , (23)
and then assign them to the analog procoder and combiner
matrices
F∗RF (:, i) = f
∗
i , (24)
W∗RF,b(:, i) = w
∗
i . (25)
Particularly, before executing the next iteration, we need to
remove the components of previous determined precoders and
combiners from the other data streams’ channels such that
similar analog precoders and combiners will not be selected
by two different data streams. To achieve this goal, we let pi
and qi be the components of the determined analog precoder
and combiner for the i-th data stream, respectively. When i =
1, p1 = f
∗
1 and q1 = w
∗
1; when i > 1, the orthogonormal
component pi and qi can be obtained by a Gram-Schmidt
procedure:
pi = f
∗
i −
i−1∑
j=1
pHj f
∗
i pj ,
pi = pi/‖pi‖, i = 2, . . . , NRF ; (26)
qi = w
∗
i −
i−1∑
j=1
qHj w
⋆
i qj ,
qi = qi/‖qi‖, i = 2, . . . , NRF . (27)
Then Hi+1 is updated for the next iteration by:
Hi+1 = (INb − qiqHi )Hi(INa − pipHi ). (28)
After determining the analog precoder F∗RF and com-
biner W∗RF,b, we can obtain the effective channel Heff ,
(W∗RF,b)
HHbF
∗
RF . Then, an SVD-based baseband digital
precoder is employed to further suppress the interference and
maximize the sum-rate:
F∗BB = V¯(:, 1 : Ns), (29)
W∗BB,b = U¯(:, 1 : Ns), (30)
where Heff = U¯Σ¯V¯
H . Finally, we normalize the baseband
precoder F∗BB by
F⋆BB =
√
NsF
∗
BB
‖F∗RFF∗BB‖F
. (31)
This secure hybrid precoder and combiner design algorithm is
summarized in Table I.
B. Unknown Eavesdropper’s Channel
Under this condition, by common intuition, low-power
Alice-to-Bob transmission can improve the security by making
the signal interception of Eve more difficult. Assume the
Alice-to-Bob transmission needs to satisfy the QoS threshold
Rγ , i.e. Rb ≥ Rγ , Rb = log2 det(INs + Sb). Thus, we can
utilize the proposed algorithm in Table I with initialization
H1 = Hb to find the optimal precoder F
∗
RF , F
∗
BB and
combiner W∗RF,b, W
∗
BB,b. Then, we can find the minimum
transmit power Ps such that Rb ≥ Rγ can be satisfied.
To further increase the security, the residual power PAN ,
(P − Ps)+ is utilized for generating AN.
In this AN-based secure transmission, we assume NRF >
Ns and the transmit signal becomes
x = FRF (
√
PsFBBs+
√
PANFBB,ww), (32)
TABLE I
SECURE HYBRID PRECODER AND COMBINER DESIGN ALGORITHM WITH
CSI OF EVE.
Input: F , W , H1.
Output: F∗RF , F
∗
BB , W
∗
RF,b, and W
∗
BB,b.
for i = 1 : NRF
{w∗i , f
∗
i } = arg max
wi∈W
fi∈F
|wHi Hifi|;
F∗RF (:, i) = f
∗
i ;
W∗RF,b(:, i) = w
∗
i ;
if i = 1
pi = f
∗
i , qi = w
∗
i .
else
pi = f
⋆
i −
i−1∑
j=1
pHi f
∗
i pi, pi = pi/‖pi‖;
qi = w
∗
i −
i−1∑
j=1
qHj w
∗
i qj , qi = qi/‖qi‖.
end if
Hi+1 = (INb − qiq
H
i )Hi(INa − pip
H
i ).
end for
Obtain F∗BB and W
∗
BB,b by (29)-(31).
where w represents the (NRF −Ns)×1 artificial noise vector,
E{wwH} = 1
NRF−Ns
INRF−Ns , FBB,w is the digital precoder
associated with the AN w. The idea behind the AN-based PLS
approach is that the generated AN should not degrade the
reception of Bob. To ensure this principle with the obtained
optimal combiners W∗BB,b and W
∗
RF,b, we should have
W∗HBB,bW
∗H
RF,bHbF
∗
RFFBB,w = 0 (33)
⇒W∗HBB,bHeffFBB,w = 0 (34)
whereHeff ,W
∗H
RF,bHbF
∗
RF andHeff = U¯Σ¯V¯
H by SVD. If
Ns < NRF , with the optimal W
∗
BB,b obtained by W
∗
BB,b =
U(:, 1 : Ns) as in (30), the digital precoder FBB,w for the
AN should have a form of
F∗BB,w = V(:, Ns + 1 : NRF ). (35)
Finally, we normalize the AN digital precoder as
F⋆BB,w =
F∗BB,w
‖F∗RFF∗BB,w‖F
. (36)
This AN-based secure hybrid precoder and combiner design
algorithm is summarized in Table II.
IV. SIMULATION STUDIES
In this section, we illustrate the simulation results of
the proposed hybrid precoder and combiner design for se-
cure transmission in mmWave MIMO systems. Consider a
mmWave MIMO wiretap system in which Alice, Bob and
Eve are all equipped with Na = Nb = Ne = 192 ULA
antennas. The antenna spacing of all ULAs is d = λ
2
. The
AoA/AoD is assumed to be uniformly distributed in [0, 2pi].
We assume there exists 20 scatterers from which Bob and Eve
randomly select 3 ∼ 8 scatterers as propagation paths with a
certain probability that Bob and Eve may share some common
scatterers. For simplicity, the noise variance σ2b and σ
2
e are set
to 1. The codebooks consisting of array response vectors as
TABLE II
SECURE HYBRID PRECODER AND COMBINER DESIGN ALGORITHM
WITHOUT CSI OF EVE.
Input: F , W , H1 = Hb, P , Rγ .
Output: F∗RF , F
∗
BB , W
∗
RF,b, W
∗
BB,b, F
∗
BB,w , Ps, and PAN .
1. Obtain optimal precoder F∗RF , F
∗
BB and combiner
W∗RF,b, W
∗
BB,b using Algorithm in Table I.
2. Determine minimum Ps such that Rb ≥ Rγ .
3. AN power PAN , (P − Ps)
+.
4. AN digital precoder F∗BB,w = V(:, Ns + 1 : NRF ).
5. Normalization F⋆BB,w =
F
∗
BB,w
‖F∗
RF
F∗
BB,w
‖F
.
(6) and (7) with 128 angle resolutions are uniformly quantized
in [0, 2pi].
We first consider the case that Eve’s CSI is known and
evaluate the proposed secure hybrid beamforming design al-
gorithm in Table I. For the comparison purpose, the repre-
sentative codebook-based Spatially Sparse Precoding (SSP)
algorithm with PLS effort and without PLS effort is also
studies. For the fairness, we only focus the codebook-based
algorithm and will not consider the codebook-free algorithms.
The full-digital beamforming design is also included as the
performance benchmark. Fig. 4 shows secrecy rate versus SNR
for different beamforming design algorithms. The number of
RF chains is set as NRF = 2, and the number of data streams
is also Ns = 2. It can be observed from Fig. 4 that our
proposed algorithm can significantly outperform SSP algo-
rithm in terms of secrecy rate. This result illustrates that our
proposed algorithm can more efficiently prevent eavesdropping
in the mmWave MIMO systems. However, we also notice
that our algorithm still has a notable gap between full-digital
benchmark, which inspires us to pursue a more efficient hybrid
algorithm in the future. In Fig. 5, a similar simulation is carried
out with larger number of RF chains NRF = 4 and larger
number of data streams Ns = 4. The similar conclusion can
be drawn.
Next, we focus on the case that the eavesdropper’s CSI is
unknown. The number of RF chains is set asNRF = 8, and the
number of data streams is Ns = 4. Fig. 6 shows the spectrum
efficiency of Bob Rb, spectrum efficiency of Eve Re, and the
resulting secrecy rate Rs = (Rb − Re)+ with the required
legitimate transmission QoSRγ . It can be clearly observed that
our proposed AN-based algorithm can dramatically reduce Re
by adding AN in the transmit signaling while maintaining the
required QoS Rb. Therefore, our proposed AN-based hybrid
beamforming design can implement secure transmission even
when the CSI of the passive eavesdropper is unknown. In Fig.
7, we repeat the similar simulation by increasing the number
of RF chains to NRF = 16. The secrecy performance becomes
better since more spatial DoF can be utilized for generating
AN to interrupt Eve’s reception.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a hybrid precoder and combiner
design for secure transmission in a mmWave MIMO wiretap
system. With the eavesdropper’s CSI, a joint analog precoder
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Fig. 4. Secrecy rate versus SNR (Na = Nb = Ne = 192, NRF = 2, and
Ns = 2).
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate versus SNR (Na = Nb = Ne = 192, NRF = 4, and
Ns = 4).
and combiner design algorithm was proposed to prevent the
information leakage to the eavesdropper. When eavesdropper’s
CSI is unknown, we developed an AN-based hybrid beam-
forming approach, which can jam the eavesdropper’s reception
while maintaining the required QoS of the intended receiver.
Simulation results demonstrated the significant secrecy perfor-
mance improvement of our propose algorithms compared with
other hybrid beamforming algorithms.
REFERENCES
[1] T. S. Rappaport, S. Sun, R. Mayzus, H. Zhao, Y. Azar, K. Wang, G.
N. Wong, J. K. Schulz, M. Samimi and F. Gutierrez “Millimeter wave
mobile communications for 5G cellular: It will work!” IEEE Access,
vol. 1, pp. 335-349, May 2013.
[2] Z. Wang, M. Li, X. Tian, and Q. Liu, “Iterative hybrid precoder
and combiner design for mmWave multiuser MIMO systems,” IEEE
Commun. Lett., accepted to appear, 2017.
[3] O. E. Ayach, S. Rajagopal, S. Abu-Surra, Z. Pi, and R. W. Heath Jr.,
“Spatially sparse precoding in millimeter wave MIMO systems,” IEEE
Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 1499-1513, Mar. 2014.
[4] A. Alkhateeb and R. W. Heath Jr., “Frequency selective hybrid precoding
for limited feedback millimeter wave systems,” IEEE Trans. Commun.,
vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 1801-1818, May 2016.
[5] X. Gao, L. Dai, C. Yuen, and Z. Wang, “Turbo-like beamforming based
on Tabu search algorithm for millimeter-wave massive MIMO systems,”
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 65, no. 7, pp. 5731-5737, July 2016.
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Rγ (b/s/Hz)
Sp
ec
tru
m
 E
ffi
cie
nc
y 
(b/
s/H
z)
 
 
Rb
R
e
, No PLS 
R
e
, Our w./o AN
R
e
, Our w. AN
R
s
, No PLS
R
s
, Our w./o AN
R
s
, Our w. AN
Fig. 6. Spectrum efficiency versus Rγ (Na = Nb = Ne = 192, NRF = 8,
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